Lentis Legalis | 19 April 2026
Reviewed by Adv. Chandrasen Yadav

By allowing a civil appeal, The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a rent disputes and eviction matter reiterated the legal principle quoting Maganlal son of Kishanlal Godha Vs. Nanasaheb son of Udhaorao Gadewar, that  while dealing with a landlord-tenant dispute, it was held that the adjudication of bonafide need should be done as on the date when the suit for eviction was filed, unless some subsequent event materially changes the ground of relief. It was further held that subsequent events may be considered to have overshadowed the genuineness of the landlord’s requirement only if they are of such nature and dimension as to make it lose its significance altogether.

Facts of the case: On 5th December, 1994, suit for eviction came to be filed under Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 by the legal heirs of Mr. Martins. The eviction of the sub-tenant was sought on the ground of bonafide need of the family of the principal tenant. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs required the suit premises for their bonafide need so as to occupy the same.

Before the Trial Court, the parties led evidence. By judgment dated 18th July 2001, the learned Judge of the Trial Court recorded a finding that the plaintiffs had proved their bonafide need in respect of Room No.59 that was occupied by the defendants as the said premises was required for privacy of the widow of Mr. Martins, who was an old lady having 87 years of age and there were six daughters who used to visit her place. It was further held that greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiffs if the decree for eviction was not passed. The suit was, accordingly, decreed.

The defendants being aggrieved by the decree of eviction challenged the same by filing an appeal. The Appellate Court reversed the said decree on the reasoning that the plaintiff No.1, who was the widow of Mr. Martins had expired and, therefore, the bonafide need of the plaintiffs did not survive. Accordingly, the decree for eviction was set aside and the suit for eviction was dismissed.

The original plaintiffs being aggrieved by the reversal of the decree for eviction approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and challenged the aforesaid judgment. During pendency of the petition, the original defendants placed on record an affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023, wherein it was stated that Room No.63 that was in occupation of the original plaintiffs was not being utilised by them and that the said room was occupied by some other persons. When the petition was taken up for hearing, it was noticed that the original plaintiffs had not filed any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit. The High Court, thus, held that the plaintiffs had let out Room No.63 despite the same being available to them which indicated that they did not bonafide require the suit premises. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. Being aggrieved, one of the original plaintiffs has filed the present appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Observations and Findings: Hon’ble Supreme Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the documentary material on record, opined that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 and concluded on the point that all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on the ground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of NON-TRAVERSE has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment.

Supreme Court further observed that the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction.

Accordingly, the order dated 4th February 2025 passed in Writ Petition No.1458 of 2003 was set aside. The proceedings in R.A.E. Suit No.70 of 1995 are remanded to the Small Causes Court, Mumbai for being decided afresh in accordance with law. The parties were given liberty to amend their pleadings and thereafter lead further evidence in accordance with law.

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.K. MAHESHWARI and HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ATUL S. CHANDURKAR

Read Full Judgement: Click Here

Author
Adv. Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc., LL.B. & LL.M.

Lentis Legalis | 08 April 2026
Reviewed by Adv. Chandrasen Yadav

On 13 March 2026, the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 was introduced in the Lok Sabha, proposing significant changes to the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill underscores a distinct legislative policy: to recognise and protect a specific class of transgender (TG) persons who suffer from acute social exclusion.

The Bill asserts that the original legislative intent was, and continues to be, the protection of individuals who face severe social discrimination owing to biological factors beyond their control and without any element of choice. It emphasises that the Act was designed to safeguard a narrowly defined class of persons—those historically and socially recognised as transgender—who endure extreme and systemic marginalisation. According to the proposed amendment, the statute was never intended to extend protection to all categories of gender identities, including self-perceived identities or gender fluid expressions.

A central concern highlighted by the Bill is the alleged vagueness in the existing definition of “transgender person.” It contends that such ambiguity hampers the identification of genuinely oppressed individuals and renders the implementation of various provisions—across penal, civil, and personal laws—ineffective and unworkable. Consequently, the Amendment Bill seeks to introduce a more precise and restrictive definition to ensure that the benefits of the Act reach its intended beneficiaries through clearer identification mechanisms.

The foundation of transgender jurisprudence in India can be traced to the landmark decision in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014), popularly known as the NALSA case. In this seminal judgment, the Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a “third gender” and affirmed their entitlement to fundamental rights under the Constitution. The Court unequivocally held that gender identity lies at the core of an individual’s personal autonomy and must be determined by self-identification rather than biological or medical criteria. It observed:

“Gender identity is integral to the dignity of an individual and is based on self-identification, not on surgical or medical procedures. No person can be discriminated against on the ground of gender identity.”

Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan, drawing upon a catena of judicial precedents and international human rights instruments, elaborated that gender identity is among the most fundamental aspects of life. It reflects a person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth. This understanding firmly situates gender identity within the domain of personal liberty and dignity.

The jurisprudential evolution continued with Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), where the Supreme Court decriminalised consensual same-sex relations by reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court, in doing so, foregrounded the primacy of constitutional morality over societal or majoritarian morality. It also recognised rights relating to sexual orientation, autonomy, and choice of partner as intrinsic to Article 21.

Further strengthening this framework, the nine-judge bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) affirmed that the right to privacy encompasses sexual orientation and gender identity as essential attributes of individual dignity and liberty, immune from majoritarian disapproval.

More recently, in Supriyo v. Union of India (the “Marriage Equality Case”), the Supreme Court acknowledged that transgender persons in heterosexual relationships possess the right to marry under existing legal frameworks, thereby reinforcing their legal recognition and dignity.

In light of this established jurisprudence, the 2026 Amendment Bill appears, prima facie, to depart from the constitutional principles articulated by the Supreme Court. While judicial precedents have consistently upheld self-perceived gender identity as central to personal autonomy, the proposed amendments introduce a certification regime requiring recognition by a district magistrate based on the recommendation of a designated medical board headed by a chief medical officer.

This shift from self-identification to medical verification raises critical constitutional questions. It potentially reintroduces elements of external validation and bureaucratic control over identity, which the Supreme Court had expressly sought to eliminate. Whether such a framework can withstand constitutional scrutiny—particularly in light of the principles of dignity, autonomy, and privacy—remains an open and significant question.

Read the full judgment of NALSA case. – Click Here

Read the Full Judgement of Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India. – Click Here

Read the Full Judgement of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India. – Click Here

Author
Adv. Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc., LL.B. & LL.M.

Lentis Legalis | 06 April 2026
Reviewed by Adv. Chandrasen Yadav

The doctrine of casus omissus, a Latin expression meaning “a case omitted,” refers to a situation where the legislature has failed to provide for a particular contingency within a statutory framework.

The settled principle governing this doctrine is that courts cannot supply omissions in a statute; they are bound to interpret the law as it exists, and not as it ought to be. Any attempt to fill legislative gaps would amount to judicial legislation, which is impermissible.

The law on this aspect is well crystallized. In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh,(2005) 10 SCC 437, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in cases of clear necessity, and even then, only when such necessity is evident from the four corners of the statute itself. The Court cautioned that an omission should not be readily inferred, nor can the judiciary, under the guise of interpretation, create or fill gaps in the statutory scheme.

It was further emphasized that statutory provisions must be construed as a whole, harmoniously, so as to give effect to the legislative intent. Unless the plain language of the statute leads to manifest absurdity or defeats the object of the enactment, it is not open to the Court to read into the statute words which are not expressly provided.

The Court succinctly summarized the position by holding that two principles of construction are well settled: first, that a casus omissus cannot be supplied except in cases of clear necessity discernible from the statute itself; and second, that every part of a statute must be read in context, so as to ensure a consistent and coherent interpretation of the entire enactment. A construction that leads to absurd or anomalous results may be avoided, but only within the permissible limits of interpretation—not by rewriting the statute.

Thus, the doctrine underscores a fundamental restraint on judicial power: where the legislature has consciously or inadvertently omitted a provision, the defect must be remedied by legislative action and not by judicial innovation.

Author
Adv. Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc., LL.B. & LL.M.