Lentis Legalis| 04.03.2026
Chandrasen Yadav

The appellant in the present matter, Imran Pratapgadhi who was a Member of the Rajya Sabha. The 2^nd respondent Kishan Bhai Dipak Bhai Nanda was the first informant at whose instance a First Information Report (for short, ‘FIR’) was registered with Jamnagar Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNS’).

In the complaint of the 2nd respondent, he stated that on 29th December 2024, on the occasion of the birthday of one Altaf Ghafarbhai Khafi, a member of the Municipal Corporation of Jamnagar, a mass wedding program was held at Sanjari Education and Charitable Trust. The said Municipal Councillor invited the present appellant to the function. A video of the event was made. The appellant posted the video on the social media platform ‘X’ from his verified account. The video has the recitation of a poem reproduced hereinbelow-

“ए खून (blood) के प्यासो (thirsty) बात सुनो  ग ़र हक्क़ (truth) की लडाई जुल्म (excesses/injustice) सही

  हम जुल्म (excesses/injustice) से इश्क़ (love) ननभा देंगे  गर शम- ए- नगररया (melting of a candle which resembles tears) आनतश (flame) है

  हर राह वो शम्मा (light) जला देंगे  गर लाश हमारे अपनोोंकी खतरा है तुम्हारी मसनद (throne) का

 उस रब (god) की ़सम हस्ते हस्ते नकतनी लाशे दफ़ना देंगे  ए खूनके प्यासोों बात सुनो”

The allegation in the complaint is that the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It is alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It is alleged that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

The appellant before coming to the Supreme Court had filed a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short, ‘the BNSS’) read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for quashing the said FIR in the High Court. While issuing notice on the said petition, the learned Judge had directed the appellant to file an affidavit disclosing the poem’s source. Accordingly, an affidavit was filed by the appellant but could not disclose the specific origin of the source.

The learned Single Judge of the High Court by impugned judgment and order, rejected the petition by holding that as the investigation is at a very nascent stage, interference cannot be made in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC Online SC 315.  

Appellant in support of the appeal had taken following grounds-

1. That none of the ingredients of the offences alleged against the appellant are made out on the plain reading of the complaint and the poem.
2. It cannot be said that the poem caused social disharmony amongst the people.
3.  the poem does not promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between the various religious, racial, language or regional groups and castes or communities.
4.  The plain reading of the poem indicated that it was all about sacrificing oneself to fight for rights and truth.
5. That registration of the FIR based on the said poem violates the appellant’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Supreme Court highlighting the role of dissent mentioned that Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.

Supreme Court in the Judgement mounted a standard that The Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a). We Judges are also under an obligation to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights. There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens. 

Supreme court not only set aside the impugned order of the High Court but also quashed the FIR which was registered against the Imran Pratapgaradhi.

Read full Judgement:

https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/3511/3511_2025_4_1501_60508_Judgement_28-Mar-2025.pdf

Lentis Legalis|04.03.2026
Chandrasen Yadav

The Cotton Corporation of India Limited, the first respondent, had entered into a sale agreement dated 22.01.1998 with M/s Lakshmi Ganesh Textiles Limited, the second respondent, for the supply of cotton bales. Upon failure of the purchaser to pay the sale consideration, the first respondent initiated arbitral proceedings being AP No. 9 of 1999 for recovery of the outstanding amount.

The learned arbitrator passed an award dated 11.06.2001 in favour of the first respondent for a sum of Rs. 26,00,572.90 along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum and costs. The second respondent challenged the said award by filing AOP No. 10 of 2006 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Principal District Judge, Coimbatore. The Section 34 petition came to be dismissed on 21.01.2013, and as no appeal was preferred thereafter, the arbitral award attained finality.

In the meantime, the second respondent, who was a borrower of ICICI Bank, defaulted in repayment of its dues, as a result of which the bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act on 11.11.2013 and attached the properties of the borrower. Pursuant to a tripartite agreement dated 29.12.2014 entered into between ICICI Bank, the second respondent, and the appellant, a sale deed dated 23.04.2015 was executed in favour of the appellant in respect of the EP Schedule Property.

Subsequently, in the year 2019, the first respondent initiated execution proceedings to enforce the arbitral award, which were later transferred to the court of the Principal District Judge, Tirupur. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the executing court, by order dated 19.08.2021, directed conditional attachment of the EP Schedule Property. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant, claiming to be a third-party purchaser, filed EA No. 141 of 2021 under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking removal of attachment on the ground that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the arbitral liability.

The Supreme Court noted that the appellant was a purchaser subsequent to the passing of the arbitral award for recovery of money and that the execution proceedings were pending when the sale deed was executed in his favour. It was further observed that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the purchase was made without notice of the existing claim. The Court also took note of the fact that the arbitral award continued to remain unrealised.

In view of these circumstances and by applying the ratio laid down in Danesh (supra), the Court held that the claim petition filed by the appellant had been rightly dismissed by the courts below. Consequently, the Civil Appeal was dismissed, and the executing court was directed to dispose of the execution proceedings within a period of two months.

The Court reiterated the long-standing principle, traceable even to the Privy Council, that the real difficulties of a litigant often begin only after obtaining a decree. While suits may conclude within a few years, execution proceedings frequently take much longer. Recognising this mischief, Order XXI of the CPC was substantially amended in 1976 to operate as a self-contained code, barring separate suits and prescribing strict timelines for objections.

The Court cautioned that accepting the appellant’s argument would permit pendente lite purchasers or third parties to bypass the statutory safeguards, thereby frustrating execution proceedings. Such an approach would encourage judgment-debtors to defeat decrees by transferring properties or setting up proxy objectors, resulting in endless collateral litigation and rendering decrees ineffective.

Relying upon Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew, the Court emphasised that success in litigation is meaningless unless the successful party actually obtains the relief granted. The legal system, it was observed, must ensure not merely disposal of cases, but actual enforcement of rights, so that justice is not only seen to be done but is truly achieved.

Judgement:
R. Savithri Naidu v. M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. and Another, 2026 INSC 150

efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/36664/36664_2024_9_1501_68491_Judgement_12-Feb-2026.pdf

New Delhi | February 18, 2026
LENTIS LEGALIS BREAKING

The Supreme Court of India has allowed applications seeking permission to file Review Petition(s) in a long-pending matter arising out of Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989. Importantly, applications requesting that the Review Petition be listed in open court with oral hearing have also been allowed, recognizing the significance of the issues involved. The review petition has been filed by Advocate Chandrasen Yadav, through Advocate-on-Record Kunal Yadav.

The order was passed by a Bench comprising The Chief Justice of India, Justice Augustine George Masih, and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

The Court has issued notice to the respondents, returnable on 26 February 2026, directing them to respond to the Review Petition. The Review Petition has also been tagged with Writ Petition (C) No. 1110 of 2025 (Diary No. 52914 of 2025 – Bhumika Trust) to ensure comprehensive and consistent adjudication of connected issues.

In the Writ Petition (C) No. 1110 of 2025 (Diary No. 52914 of 2025 – Bhumika Trust vs. Union of India), the Supreme Court of India has already invited suggestions from law universities across the country on the issue of mandatory three-year legal practice as a prerequisite for entry into judicial service. With the Review Petitions now permitted and ordered to be heard in open court, the forthcoming hearing will address the wider constitutional, institutional, and practical issues raised both in the Review Petitions and in the writ petition filed by Bhumika Trust, enabling a comprehensive reconsideration of the policy’s impact on law students, judicial recruitment, and access to justice.

The Review Petition assails the Supreme Court’s judgment dated 20 May 2025 in Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989, challenging the direction mandating three years’ minimum practice at the Bar for entry into the Civil Judge (Junior Division) cadre. The petitioner, Chandrasen Yadav argues that the decision is unsupported by empirical data, impact studies, or objective evaluation, and rests largely on subjective opinions of certain High Courts while ignoring dissenting views of several States and High Courts. It is contended that no credible evidence establishes that fresh law graduates perform poorly as judges or that prior advocacy experience necessarily enhances judicial competence, particularly when rigorous competitive examinations and structured judicial training exist. The petition further highlights that the judgment selectively overlooks key recommendations of the Justice Shetty Commission, earlier binding precedent in All India Judges Association (1993), and the role of institutional training as an alternative to mandatory practice. The uniform, nationwide imposition of the rule is alleged to be arbitrary, exclusionary, and disproportionate, adversely impacting economically weaker sections, SC/ST/OBC candidates, recent graduates, and those working in law firms, PSUs, or corporate roles. It is also argued that the absence of a transitional mechanism, the impractical certificate requirement, and the coercive nature of forcing graduates into litigation practice infringe Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The petitioner asserts that by effectively prescribing eligibility norms without legislative backing or inclusive consultation, the ruling raises serious constitutional concerns regarding arbitrariness, equal opportunity, and access to judicial service, warranting reconsideration by the Supreme Court of India.

The matter is now scheduled for further proceedings upon return of notice on 26.02.2026.