Lentis Legalis | 06 April 2026
Reviewed by Adv. Chandrasen Yadav

The doctrine of casus omissus, a Latin expression meaning “a case omitted,” refers to a situation where the legislature has failed to provide for a particular contingency within a statutory framework.

The settled principle governing this doctrine is that courts cannot supply omissions in a statute; they are bound to interpret the law as it exists, and not as it ought to be. Any attempt to fill legislative gaps would amount to judicial legislation, which is impermissible.

The law on this aspect is well crystallized. In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh,(2005) 10 SCC 437, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in cases of clear necessity, and even then, only when such necessity is evident from the four corners of the statute itself. The Court cautioned that an omission should not be readily inferred, nor can the judiciary, under the guise of interpretation, create or fill gaps in the statutory scheme.

It was further emphasized that statutory provisions must be construed as a whole, harmoniously, so as to give effect to the legislative intent. Unless the plain language of the statute leads to manifest absurdity or defeats the object of the enactment, it is not open to the Court to read into the statute words which are not expressly provided.

The Court succinctly summarized the position by holding that two principles of construction are well settled: first, that a casus omissus cannot be supplied except in cases of clear necessity discernible from the statute itself; and second, that every part of a statute must be read in context, so as to ensure a consistent and coherent interpretation of the entire enactment. A construction that leads to absurd or anomalous results may be avoided, but only within the permissible limits of interpretation—not by rewriting the statute.

Thus, the doctrine underscores a fundamental restraint on judicial power: where the legislature has consciously or inadvertently omitted a provision, the defect must be remedied by legislative action and not by judicial innovation.

Author
Adv. Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc., LL.B. & LL.M.

Lentis Legalis | 23 March 2026
Reviewed by Adv. Chandrasen Yadav

Section – 102 BNS: Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.—

If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.

Section 102 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 statutorily recognizes the principle of transfer of malice/transmigration of malice. This doctrine permits the prosecution of an offender where the harm is caused to a person other than the one originally intended, by transferring the malicious intent from the intended target to the actual victim.

Relevant Cases –

R Vs Mitchell (1983)

Emperor Vs Mushnooru Suryanarayana Murthy (1912)

Author
Adv. Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc., LL.B. & LL.M.

Lentis Legalis | 22 March 2026
Reviewed by Adv. Chandrasen Yadav

The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, meaning “false in one thing, false in everything,” suggests that if a witness is found to have made a false statement on a material point, their entire testimony should be discarded. In its strict form, the doctrine implies that once a witness is proved untruthful in any part, it becomes desirable to reject the whole of their evidence, and consequently, the prosecution case built upon it.

The doctrine originated in the common law system, tracing back to the late seventeenth century. At one point, it operated as a mandatory presumption that a witness who had lied in any respect was wholly unreliable. However, by the nineteenth century, English courts began to dilute this rigidity, holding that the maxim should not be applied as an inflexible rule of law, but rather as a rule of caution. Courts were advised to assess evidence carefully, separating truth from falsehood instead of discarding the entire testimony outright.

Status of the Maxim in India:

Maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end.

Maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of the rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence.’ 

Important Cases on the Point:

Gangadhar Behera And Ors vs State Of Orissa, 2002
Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [AIR 1957 SC 366 : 1957 Cri LJ 550]

Author
Adv. Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc., LL.B. & LL.M.