Lentis Legalis| 04.03.2026
Chandrasen Yadav

The appellant in the present matter, Imran Pratapgadhi who was a Member of the Rajya Sabha. The 2^nd respondent Kishan Bhai Dipak Bhai Nanda was the first informant at whose instance a First Information Report (for short, ‘FIR’) was registered with Jamnagar Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNS’).

In the complaint of the 2nd respondent, he stated that on 29th December 2024, on the occasion of the birthday of one Altaf Ghafarbhai Khafi, a member of the Municipal Corporation of Jamnagar, a mass wedding program was held at Sanjari Education and Charitable Trust. The said Municipal Councillor invited the present appellant to the function. A video of the event was made. The appellant posted the video on the social media platform ‘X’ from his verified account. The video has the recitation of a poem reproduced hereinbelow-

“ए खून (blood) के प्यासो (thirsty) बात सुनो  ग ़र हक्क़ (truth) की लडाई जुल्म (excesses/injustice) सही

  हम जुल्म (excesses/injustice) से इश्क़ (love) ननभा देंगे  गर शम- ए- नगररया (melting of a candle which resembles tears) आनतश (flame) है

  हर राह वो शम्मा (light) जला देंगे  गर लाश हमारे अपनोोंकी खतरा है तुम्हारी मसनद (throne) का

 उस रब (god) की ़सम हस्ते हस्ते नकतनी लाशे दफ़ना देंगे  ए खूनके प्यासोों बात सुनो”

The allegation in the complaint is that the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It is alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It is alleged that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

The appellant before coming to the Supreme Court had filed a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short, ‘the BNSS’) read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for quashing the said FIR in the High Court. While issuing notice on the said petition, the learned Judge had directed the appellant to file an affidavit disclosing the poem’s source. Accordingly, an affidavit was filed by the appellant but could not disclose the specific origin of the source.

The learned Single Judge of the High Court by impugned judgment and order, rejected the petition by holding that as the investigation is at a very nascent stage, interference cannot be made in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC Online SC 315.  

Appellant in support of the appeal had taken following grounds-

1. That none of the ingredients of the offences alleged against the appellant are made out on the plain reading of the complaint and the poem.
2. It cannot be said that the poem caused social disharmony amongst the people.
3.  the poem does not promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between the various religious, racial, language or regional groups and castes or communities.
4.  The plain reading of the poem indicated that it was all about sacrificing oneself to fight for rights and truth.
5. That registration of the FIR based on the said poem violates the appellant’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Supreme Court highlighting the role of dissent mentioned that Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.

Supreme Court in the Judgement mounted a standard that The Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a). We Judges are also under an obligation to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights. There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens. 

Supreme court not only set aside the impugned order of the High Court but also quashed the FIR which was registered against the Imran Pratapgaradhi.

Read full Judgement:

https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/3511/3511_2025_4_1501_60508_Judgement_28-Mar-2025.pdf

This appeal was at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh and was directed against the judgment and order dated 29.06.2010 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh of judicature at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2004 whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent herein and acquitted him of the offence under Section(s) 302, 201 and 34 respectively of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the ‘IPC’).

The deceased, namely, Birendra Kumari was married to the respondent accused. In the wedlock, two sons and a daughter named Rani were born. Rani at the time of the incident in 2003, was seven years of age.

On 15.07.2003 sometime during the midnight, Bhoora Singh @ Yashpal i.e., the complainant along with his father Bharat Singh; reported an incident of unnatural death to the Indar Police Station at around 9:00 AM . In the said report, the Complainants stated that on the fateful night of the incident, at around 12:00 AM, they heard the cries and screams of the deceased which eventually ceased. Shortly, thereafter they saw the accused along with his family members cremating the deceased in their field. It was further stated that when they went to the house of the accused to inquire about the incident, the daughter of the deceased (Rani) informed that her mother had died.

Upon enquiry done by ASI Mahendra Singh Chauhan an FIR was lodged bearing no. 142 of 2003 dated 20.07.2003 came to be registered against the respondent and her sister, Jatan Bai for the offence punishable under Section(s) 302, 201 read with 34 respectively of the IPC.

Trial Court vide its final judgment and order dated 09.08.2004 passed in Sessions Trial No. 197 of 2003 held the respondent accused guilty of the said offences of IPC.

The accused convict being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the High Court by way of Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2004. The High Court vide its final judgment and order dated 29.06.2010 allowed the appeal and acquitted the respondent accused.

The High Court holding the oral evidence of the daughter, who was just 7 years old at the time of incidence being unreliable and some other reasons to extended the benefit of doubt to the accused.

The Supreme Court of India, in the present matter, examined the law relating to the evidentiary value of a child witness and the tests for identifying tutored testimony. The Court held that the evidence of a child witness stands on the same footing as that of any other witness, subject to certain well-recognised safeguards and caution. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court were set aside, and the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court in S.T. No. 197 of 2003 were restored.

Author
Chandrasen Yadav
B.Sc, LL.B& LL.M

New Delhi | February 18, 2026
LENTIS LEGALIS BREAKING

The Supreme Court of India has allowed applications seeking permission to file Review Petition(s) in a long-pending matter arising out of Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989. Importantly, applications requesting that the Review Petition be listed in open court with oral hearing have also been allowed, recognizing the significance of the issues involved. The review petition has been filed by Advocate Chandrasen Yadav, through Advocate-on-Record Kunal Yadav.

The order was passed by a Bench comprising The Chief Justice of India, Justice Augustine George Masih, and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

The Court has issued notice to the respondents, returnable on 26 February 2026, directing them to respond to the Review Petition. The Review Petition has also been tagged with Writ Petition (C) No. 1110 of 2025 (Diary No. 52914 of 2025 – Bhumika Trust) to ensure comprehensive and consistent adjudication of connected issues.

In the Writ Petition (C) No. 1110 of 2025 (Diary No. 52914 of 2025 – Bhumika Trust vs. Union of India), the Supreme Court of India has already invited suggestions from law universities across the country on the issue of mandatory three-year legal practice as a prerequisite for entry into judicial service. With the Review Petitions now permitted and ordered to be heard in open court, the forthcoming hearing will address the wider constitutional, institutional, and practical issues raised both in the Review Petitions and in the writ petition filed by Bhumika Trust, enabling a comprehensive reconsideration of the policy’s impact on law students, judicial recruitment, and access to justice.

The Review Petition assails the Supreme Court’s judgment dated 20 May 2025 in Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989, challenging the direction mandating three years’ minimum practice at the Bar for entry into the Civil Judge (Junior Division) cadre. The petitioner, Chandrasen Yadav argues that the decision is unsupported by empirical data, impact studies, or objective evaluation, and rests largely on subjective opinions of certain High Courts while ignoring dissenting views of several States and High Courts. It is contended that no credible evidence establishes that fresh law graduates perform poorly as judges or that prior advocacy experience necessarily enhances judicial competence, particularly when rigorous competitive examinations and structured judicial training exist. The petition further highlights that the judgment selectively overlooks key recommendations of the Justice Shetty Commission, earlier binding precedent in All India Judges Association (1993), and the role of institutional training as an alternative to mandatory practice. The uniform, nationwide imposition of the rule is alleged to be arbitrary, exclusionary, and disproportionate, adversely impacting economically weaker sections, SC/ST/OBC candidates, recent graduates, and those working in law firms, PSUs, or corporate roles. It is also argued that the absence of a transitional mechanism, the impractical certificate requirement, and the coercive nature of forcing graduates into litigation practice infringe Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The petitioner asserts that by effectively prescribing eligibility norms without legislative backing or inclusive consultation, the ruling raises serious constitutional concerns regarding arbitrariness, equal opportunity, and access to judicial service, warranting reconsideration by the Supreme Court of India.

The matter is now scheduled for further proceedings upon return of notice on 26.02.2026.