Consent, Criminal Law, and Constitutional Balance: ‘Romeo–Juliet’ Clause in POCSO

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) was enacted in India as a stringent legal measure in response to the widespread and deeply troubling problem of child sexual abuse. Its objective was clear and uncompromising – to protect children from sexual exploitation through a zero-tolerance legal framework. Yet, more than a decade after its implementation, a disturbing paradox has emerged: a law designed to safeguard minors is being used to criminalize consensual relationships between adolescents.

This concern has now received official judicial recognition. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anirudh and Others, while hearing a bail application, the Supreme Court urged the central government to examine the possibility of incorporating a “Romeo-Juliet” clause into the POCSO framework. The Court’s observation reflects a ground reality that has long been apparent to trial courts and High Courts – that POCSO is often invoked not in cases of predatory abuse, but in consensual relationships between adolescents with minor age differences.

POCSO is a strict liability law. The consent of a person under the age of eighteen is legally deemed irrelevant, regardless of the nature of the relationship or the proximity in age between the parties. While such stringency is justifiable – and indeed necessary – in cases involving coercion, seduction, or sexual exploitation, its mechanical application to adolescent romantic relationships has resulted in outcomes that are patently incongruous.

Young boys are routinely charged with serious sexual offenses, subjected to prolonged incarceration, social ostracism, and the lifelong stigma of a criminal record. Girls, even when they explicitly consent, are relegated to the legal status of “victims.” Families get entangled in protracted criminal trials, and scarce judicial resources are diverted to cases that reflect social anxieties, parental disagreements, or caste-based animosities rather than actual sexual violence.

Significantly, the Supreme Court’s subsequent observation goes further by explicitly acknowledging that POCSO is often misused as a tool to settle personal scores, enforce parental authority, or uphold social norms. Such an admission from the Supreme Court carries considerable institutional and policy significance.

A “Romeo-Juliet” clause—recognized in several countries worldwide—creates a limited exception in statutory rape laws where the relationship is consensual and the age difference between the individuals is minimal. Rather than weakening child protection laws, such a provision introduces proportionality, context, and legal realism into their application. By distinguishing exploitative behavior from age-appropriate intimacy, the law can preserve POCSO’s true deterrent force against genuine abuse, while simultaneously preventing adolescence itself from becoming criminalized. The purpose of criminal law is to punish harm—not young love.

Equally important is the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of procedural safeguards. By setting aside the Allahabad High Court’s sweeping directions on determining age through medical examinations, the Court reinforced the statutory scheme under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court clarified that documentary evidence should be given primacy in age determination, and medical tests should be resorted to only as a last resort.

This emphasis on due process is crucial. In sensitive and punitive laws like POCSO, procedural shortcuts can inflict irreversible harm on young lives.

The Supreme Court has now placed this responsibility squarely on the legislature. A carefully crafted Romeo-Juliet clause—limited to consensual relationships between teenagers of similar age—could restore balance within the POCSO framework. Simultaneously, as the court has clearly stated, effective mechanisms must be developed to prevent and punish the deliberate misuse of the Act.

Child protection laws must evolve with social realities. Justice is not served when protection becomes punishment. The judiciary has signaled the need for reform; it is now the legislature’s responsibility to respond with sensitivity, nuance, and constitutional understanding.

Chandrasen Yadav

B.Sc & L.L.B from Allahabad University

LL.M from Central University of Punjab

Lucknow