CASE REVIEW OF DELHI RIOTS CASE: bail denied to Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid but granted to five others

The Supreme Court denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in a judgement out of a common judgment and order passed denying the bail to all the accused of the Delhi riot case by the High Court of Delhi. The appellants stand arraigned as accused in FIR No. 59 of 2020 registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi, arising out of the incidents that occurred in several parts of Delhi in February 2020.

The appellants Sharjeel Imam, Umar Khalid, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, Meeran Haider, Shadab Ahmed, and Gulfisha Fatima had filed appeal against the judgement of the High Court of Delhi before the Supreme Court.

At the inception, the appellants were booked under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet came to be filed alleging offences under Sections 120B read with Sections 109, 114, 124A, 147, 148, 149, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307, 341, 353, 395, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452, 454, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as also under Sections 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.

The prosecution case, as placed before the Court, proceeded on the ground that the incidents of violence were not isolated or spontaneous, but were the outcome of a larger conspiracy in which several accused persons are alleged to have participated at different stages and in different capacities. While the FIR and the impugned judgment are common, the role attributed to each appellant, the nature of the allegations, and the material relied upon by the prosecution are not uniform.

According to the prosecution it was alleged that a pre-planned criminal conspiracy involving several accused persons, including the present appellants was hatched with the object of orchestrating riots, which culminated in the deliberate incitement of widespread communal violence on and around 22nd, 23rd, and 24th February 2020. The acts allegedly committed during this period were not spontaneous but were the outcome of coordinated efforts to inflame tensions, mobilise crowds, and execute violent actions across various parts of Delhi as a form of protest against the enactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 and the proposed National Register of Citizens.

The riots resulted in grave consequences, including the loss of 54 lives, among them a senior police officer and an Intelligence Bureau official, as well as grievous injuries to several police personnel and civilians. In addition, extensive damage was caused to over 1,500 public and private properties, alongside substantial intangible harm to public order, social harmony, and the nation at large.

It was also alleged that, as part of the said conspiracy, Umar Khalid delivered provocative speeches calling upon people to come out on the streets and block roads during the visit of the then President of the United States of America, Mr. Donald Trump, on 24th and 25th February 2020. The alleged objective of such actions was to internationalise a narrative that minorities in India were being illtreated and tortured. It is further alleged that women and children were deliberately mobilised to come out on the streets in various localities of Delhi to escalate tensions and precipitate communal violence.

The FIR further reveals that, in several areas’ weapons and incendiary materials such as firearms, petrol bombs, acid bottles, stones, slingshots and other dangerous substances were allegedly stockpiled in homes in advance.

A fervent plea was addressed on behalf of the appellants resting on constitutional grounds that prolonged incarceration, coupled with the absence of any realistic prospect of early conclusion of trial, rendered continued detention constitutionally impermissible and mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution is at peril.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s judgement which recognised earlier that personal liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of procedural stagnation, and that prolonged pretrial incarceration may, in appropriate cases, justify constitutional intervention notwithstanding statutory restrictions on bail. It was submitted by the appellants that they had been in custody for a substantial length of time; that the progress of trial had been slow; and that the complexity of the prosecution rendered the likelihood of its early conclusion uncertain.

Reference was made to the nature of the allegations, the statutory framework invoked, and the role attributed to individual appellants. It is the reflection of the legal reality that the constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum.

The highlighted that record discloses that all the appellants do not stand on an equal footing as regards culpability. The allegations against the principal accused indicate a central and directive role in conceptualising, planning, and coordinating the alleged terrorist act, whereas the material against certain co-accused reflects conduct of a subsidiary or facilitative nature. The hierarchy of participation, emerging from the prosecution’s case itself, requires the Court to assess each application individually, rather than proceed on the premise of equivalence. Such differentiation is intrinsic to criminal adjudication and operates irrespective of the uniformity of charges framed.

In the case of the alleged masterminds i.e., Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, the prosecution material comprises direct, corroborative, and contemporaneous evidence, including recoveries, digital communication trails, and statements indicative of managerial responsibility. In contrast, the involvement of others is sought to be established mainly through associative or peripheral conduct. The Court cannot ignore that where evidentiary strength varies materially between accused persons, the need for continued detention likewise varies. Detention that remains necessary to secure ongoing prosecutorial 30 objectives for the principal offenders may not retain the same necessity for those of limited attribution.

The alleged masterminds are stated to have exercised command authority and to possess the ability to mobilise or influence individuals within and outside their immediate circle. Such allegations, when supported by preliminary material, compel heightened caution regarding the possibility of interference with witnesses or reactivation of dormant networks. As against this, co-accused with no independent capacity to mobilise resources or exert organisational leverage do not present the same systemic risk. The logic of detention cannot be applied homogenously where the risk profiles of the accused are markedly dissimilar.

The alleged masterminds are stated to have exercised command authority and to possess the ability to mobilise or influence individuals within and outside their immediate circle. Such allegations, when supported by preliminary material, compel heightened caution regarding the possibility of interference with witnesses or reactivation of dormant networks. As against this, co-accused with no independent capacity to mobilise resources or exert organisational leverage do not present the same systemic risk. The logic of detention cannot be applied homogenously where the risk profiles of the accused are markedly dissimilar.

It is well recognised that Article 21 rights, though not absolute, require the State and the Court to justify continued custody with reference to the specific individual before it. Treating all accused identically irrespective of their roles would risk transforming pre-trial detention into a punitive mechanism divorced from individual circumstances. The constitutional mandate demands a differentiated inquiry: where prolonged custody disproportionately burdens those whose roles are limited, the balance between individual liberty and collective security may call for conditional release, while the same balance may tilt differently for those alleged to have orchestrated the offence.

The statutory restrictions under special enactments do not preclude the Court from recognising distinctions between accused persons based on the quality of material, the nature of involvement, and the necessity of further detention.

At the outset, Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are prima facie attributed a central role and alleged to be ideological drivers of the alleged conspiracy.

Even in the narrative concerning escalation into violence, the role attributed to the remaining accused is largely proximate and reactive, arising from developments at specific protest sites. Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, on the 33 other hand, are alleged to have operated remotely away from the sites of violence, with no direct attribution of participation in acts of arson, assault, or destruction of property. The prosecution case thus proceeds on the footing that the former category of accused was involved in facilitating execution, whereas the latter were involved in conceptualisation and supervision.

A principle lies at the heart of constitutional adjudication in matters of this nature. The Constitution guarantees personal liberty, but it does not conceive liberty as an isolated or absolute entitlement, detached from the security of the society in which it operates. The sovereignty, integrity, and security of the nation, as well as the preservation of public order, are not abstract concerns rather they are constitutional values which Parliament is entitled to protect through law.

This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material, taken at face value as required at this stage, discloses a prima facie attribution of a central and formative role by the appellants i.e. Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged conspiracy. The material suggests involvement at the level of planning, mobilisation, and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised acts. The statutory threshold under Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, therefore stands attracted qua these appellants.

Supreme Court held that on the completion of the examination of the protected witnesses relied upon by the prosecution, or upon the expiry of a period of one year from the date of this order, whichever is earlier, these two appellants would be at liberty to renew their prayer for grant of  bail before the jurisdictional Court.

The bail applications of appellants Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed are allowed as the Court is of the view that, having regard to the role attributed, the nature of the material relied upon, and the present stage of the proceedings, continued incarceration is not shown to be indispensable to the conduct of a fair trial, provided strict safeguards are imposed. The grant of bail in their favour does not reflect any dilution of the seriousness of the allegations, nor does it amount to a finding on guilt. It represents a calibrated exercise of constitutional discretion, structured to preserve both liberty of the individual and security of the nation.

Advocate Chandrasen Yadav

B.Sc & LL.B from Allahabad University

LL.M from Central University of Punjab

Lucknow